



Providing support to the Maritime Authority of the Republic of San Marino

San Marino Bulletin

SMBU – 2025 - 020

08 July 2025

Security Bulletin – Update on the ongoing security instability in the southern Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden.

TO: Recognised Security Organisations, Shipowners, Companies, Masters, Seafarers, SMSR partners, SMSR brokers, Surveyors, and the general public.



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Rev. No.	Date	Changes	Initials
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1. Introduction

Noting the two following reported recent attacks in the southern Red Sea (SW waters off Yemeni port of Al Hudaydah):

- July 06th, 2025 (1125 UTC): on the M/V MAGIC SEAS (IMO 9736169) in position Lat. 14° 28'N and Long. 042° 03'E;
- July 07th, 2025 (1721 UTC): on the M/V ETERNITY C (IMO 9588249) in position Lat. 14° 28'N and Long. 042° 10'E.

Considering the enhanced security instability as well as the connected threats to ships navigating or operating in the sea areas of the southern Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden.

It is recommended that the JMIC guidance, provided by Joint Maritime Information Centre JMIC, should be read onboard ships flying the San Marino flag and by their companies and owners as a complement to the rules, recommendations and information already provided in the following documents of the San Marino Maritime Navigation Authority, and the San Marino Ship Registry:

1. Directive 6/2024 SEC 3.3 dated 30 October 2024, setting Security Level 2 and other protective measures for ships flying the San Marino flag while navigating, being at anchor or being moored in the Red Sea (Part of), the Strait of Bab el Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden;
2. San Marino Bulletin SMBU – 2025 – 015 on the 03 February 2025: Threat to merchant marine, and ship's protection in the Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the northwestern Indian Ocean, paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5;
3. San Marino Bulletin SMBU – 2025 – 016 on the 03 April 2025 providing information on the publication, amongst the others, of the "Maritime Industry Security Threat Overview (MISTO), chapter: Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Northwest Indian Ocean – Houthi insurgents".

2. JMIC Information Note No. 117 (Incident report Ref. UKMTO warning incident 026)

Owners, operators, masters and seafarers are recommended to take into account the following information while carrying out the risk assessment before entering the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden:

1. The current threat assessment identifies:
 - a. Ships with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
 - b. Any ships within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the Company has been identified making port calls to Israel at high risk.
2. Ships intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:



Providing support to the Maritime Authority of the Republic of San Marino

- a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area
- b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area, is to be very carefully considered as part of the voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting:
 - i. Consider that AIS transmission may compromise the safety and security of the ship and crew
 - ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by “Dead Reckoning”
- d. Do not loiter when transiting the threat area and proceed with caution
- e. If contacted by any unrecognized organization, report back to your Company Security Officer and validate the source before responding
- f. If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
 - i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if it is safe to do so
 - ii. Describe the incident in follow up report to UKMTO
- g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
 - i. UAV sighting
 - ii. Communications challenges
- h. In case of unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
 - i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
 - ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
 - iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
 - iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)
- i. Use of Best Management Practices (BMP) Maritime Security (MS) should be considered

3. Maritime Industry is recommended to:

1. Conduct a threat and risk assessment of all associated ships and especially those that may have previous USA, UK or Israel ownership or associations (to include recent port calls by ships within the company and/or group structure)



Providing support to the Maritime Authority of the Republic of San Marino

2. Companies should plan and implement risk mitigation measures in advance of the furthest identified attack areas as depicted in the JMIC “Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities”
3. If an association is made, companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
4. Ensure their managed ships receive and follow the appropriate guidance
5. Review digital footprint
6. While considering the increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators:
 - a. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, ships should report back to company security officer and validate the source before responding
 - b. Any response should be carefully considered
 - c. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi’s Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with the CSO
 - d. Open-source claims that ships are targeted may not be factual and JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy.

4. GPS/GNSS Interference

JMIC has received widespread report of GPS interference at multiple locations in central and southern areas of the Red Sea. The interference in the central Red Sea is assessed to be related to Sudan’s civil war.

Therefore, during the period of GPS uncertainty it would be prudent for mariners to consider using also traditional – non electronic – means of position fixing to cross check the ship’s position until further notice.

5. Additional Resources

1. Additional resources on incident:
UKMTO reporting visit: <https://www.ukmto.org>
Email: <https://www.ukmto.org>
Emergency Tel: +44 (0)2392 222060



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2. Additional resources on industry guidance:
BMP5: <https://www.ics-shipping.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/bmp5-hi-res-min.pdf>
BMP MS: https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/lx4jmieu/bmp-ms_final_hi_res_s.pdf
MISTO: <https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/hcjxkcn/2025-03-31-misto-final.pdf>
3. ATP – 02.1 NCAGS Guide to owners, operator, master and officers:
https://shipping.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=692&ver=2
4. JMIC Info notes, Advisories, Weekly summary, etc.:
<https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic->

6. Updating References

The Security Bulletin SMBU – 2025 – 019 on the 28 May 2025 “Ongoing security instability in the southern Red Sea, the Strait of Bab el Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden” is revoked.